PRATT v. GRAND TRUNK RAILWAY CO.
although he may have acted in good
faith, upon the ,ncage received, to
his great damag;
e hut it cannot yet
be conidcred settled, in this country,
that thk English rule will prevail here.
See Lr,land v. GUren, 40 Wis. 431
(1876).
The English law agrees with ours
that ift the defelant owes a duty to
the plaintiff, though it grow out of a
contract nmade by the defendant with a
third person, a positive breach of that
duty gives the plaintiff a right of action,

RECENT

whether such third person has or has
not also a cause of action for the breach
of the contract merely ; but the English courts do not thus far recognise the
existence of such a duty betwecn a telegraph company and the person to
whom the message is addressed. Still,
in the light of their own analogies and
decisions, it may not he yet conclusively
and finally settled, even there, that the
company are not liable to the receiver
in some form of action.
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The liability of a carrier commences when the goods are delivered to, and
accepted by, him or his authorized agent, for transportation.
If a common carrier agrees that property intended for transportation by him
may be deposited at a particular place without express notice to him, such deposit
amounts to notice and is a delivery.
The liability of the carrier is fixed by accepting the property to be transported,
and the acceptance is complete wfienever the property thus comes into his possession with his assent.
If the deposit of the goods is a mere accessory to the carriage, that is, if they
are deposited for the purpose of being carried, without further orders, the responsibility of the carrier begins from the time they are received ; but when they are
subject to the further order of the owner, the case is otherwise.

IN error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Michigan.
This was an action to recover damages for a violation of defendants' duty as a common carrier in respect to certain merchandise
shipped from Liverpool to St. Louis, and carried over its road from
Montreal to Detroit. The goods reached the city of Detroit on
the 17th of October 1865, and on the night of the 18th of the
same month -were destroyed by fire. The other facts are stated in
the opinion of the court, which was delivered by
HUNT, J.-The defendant claims to have made a complete delivery of the goods to the Michigan Central Railroad Company, a
succeeding carrier, and thus to have discharged itself from liability
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before the occurrence of the fire. If the liability of the succeeding
carrier had attached, the liability of the defendant was discharged:
Ransom v. Holland, 59 N. Y. 611; O'Neil v. N. Y. Central,
60 Id. 138. The question therefore is, had the duty of the succeeding carrier commenced when the goods were burned? The
liability of a carrier commences when the goods are delivered to him
or his authorized agent for transportation and are accepted: Rogers
v. Wheeler, 52 N. Y. 262 ; Grosvenor v. N. Y. Central,59 Id. 34.
If a commoni carrier agrees that property intended for transpor-"
tation by him may be deposited at a particular place without express
notice to him, such deposit amounts to notice and is a delivery:
Merriam v. Hartford Railroad Co., 20 Conn. 354; Converse v.
N. & N. Y. Trans. Co., 38 Id. 166.
The liability of the carrier is fixed by accepting the property to
be transported, and the acceptance is complete whenever the property thus comes into his possession with his assent: -TlinoisRailroad Co. v. Smyser, 38 Ill. 3§4.
If the deposit of the goods is a mere accessory to the carriagethat is, if they are deposited for the purpose of being carried, without further ord6rs, the responsibility of the carrier begins from the
time they are received, but when they are subject to the further
order of the owner, the case is otherwise: Ladere v. Griffith, 25
N. Y. 364; Blossom v. Griffin, 13 Id. 569; Wade v. Wheeler,
47 Id. 658; Michigan Railroad Co. v. Schurtz, 7 Mich. 515.
The same proposition is stated in a different form when it is said
that the liability of a carrier is discharged by a delivery of the
goods. If he is an intermediate carrier, this duty is performed by
a delivery to the succeeding carrier for further transportation, and
an acceptance by him.
The precise facts upon which the question here arises are as
follows: At the time the fire occurred the defendant had no freightroom or depot at Detroit, excepf a single apartment in the freightdepot of the Michigan Central Railroad Company. Said depot
was a building several hundred feet in length, and some three or
four hundred feet in width, and was all under one roof. It was
divided into sections or apartments, without any partition wall
between them. There was a railway track in the centre of the
building, upon which cars were run into the building to be loaded
with freight. The only use which the defendant had of said section was for the deposit of all goods and property which came over
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its road or was delivered for shipment over it. This section, in
common with the rest of the building, was under the control and
supervision of the Michigan Central Railroad Company, as hereinafter mentioned. The defendant employed in this section twoanen,
who checked freight which came into it. All freight which came
into the section was handled exclusively by the employees of the
Michigan Central Railroad Company, for which, as well as for the
use of said section, said defendant paid said company a fixed compensation per hundred weight. Goods which came into the section
from defendant's road, destined ower the road of the Michigan
Central Railroad Company, were at the time of unloading from
defendant's cars deposited by said employees of the Michigan Central Railroad Company in a certain place in said section, from
which they were loaded into the cars of said latter company by
said employees when they were ready to receive them; and after
they were so placed the defendant's employees did not further
handle said goods. Whenever the agent of the Michigan Central
Railroad Company would see any goods deposited in the section of
said freight building set apart for the use of the defendant, destined over the line of said Central Railroad, he would call upon
the agent of the defendant in said freight building, and, from a
way-bill exhibited to him by said agent, he would take a list of
said goods, and would then, also, for the first time, learn their
ultimate place of destination, together with the amount of freightcharges due thereon ; that from the information thus obtained from
said way-bill in the hands of the defendant's agent, a way-bill
would be made out by the Michigan Central Railroad Company for
the transportation of said goods over its line of railway, and not
before.
These goods were, on the 17th of October 1865, taken from the
cars and deposited in the apartment of said building used as aforesaid by the defendant, in the place assigned as aforesaid for goods
so' destined.
At the time the goods in question were forwarded from Montreal,
in accordance with the usage in such cases, a way-bill was then
made out in duplicate, on which was entered a list of said goods,
the names of the consignees, the places to which the goods were
consigned, and the amount of charges against them from Liverpool
to Detroit. One of these way-bills was given to the conductor
who had charge of the train containing the goods, and the other
VOL. XXVI.-3O
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was forwarded to the agent of the defendant in Detroit. On
arrival of the goods at Detroit, the conductor delivered his copy
of said way-bill to the checking clerk of defendant in said scction,
from which said clerk checked said goods from the cars into said
section. It was the practice of the Michigan Central R aih'oad
Company, before forwarding such goods, to take from said way-bill
in the custody of said checking clerk, in the manner aforesaid, the
place of destination and a list of said goods, and the amount of
accumulated charges, and to collect the same, together with its own
charges, of the connecting carrier.
Weare all of the opinion that these acts constituted a complete
delivery of the goods to the Michigan Central Company, by which
the liability of the Grand Trunk Company was terminated.
1. They were placed within the control of the agents of the Michigan Company.
2. They were deposited by the one party and receive( by the
other for transportation, the deposit being an accessory merely to
such transportation.
3. No further orders or directions from the Grand Trunk Company were expected by the receiving party. Except for the occurrence of the fire the goods would have been loaded into the cars of
the Michigan Central Company, and forwarded without further
action of the Grand Trunk Company.
4. Under the arrangement between the parties, the presence of
the goods in the precise locality agreed upon, and the marks upon
them-" P. & F., St. Louis"-were sufficient notice that they were
there for transportation over the Miichigan road towards the city of
St. Louis, and such was the understanding of both parties.
The cases heretofore cited in 20 Conn. 354, and 33 Id. 166, are
strong authorities upon the point last stated. In the latter case a
railroad company and a steamboat company had a covered wharf in
common, at their common terminus, used as a depot and a wharf,
and it was the established usage for the steamboat company to land
goods for the railroad, on the arrival of its boats in the iight, upon
a particular place in the depot, whence they were taken by the railroad company at. its convenience for further transportation, both
companies having equal possession of the depot. There was no evidence of an actual agreement that the goods deposited were in the
possession of the railroad company, and the goods in question had
not been in the manual possession of the railroad company when
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they were destroyed by fire on the Sunday afternoon following their
depo.-it on the previous night. It was held that there was a tacit
undlerstanding that the steamboat company should deposit their
freight at that particular spot, and that the railroad should take it
thence at their convenience. The delivery to the succeeding carrier
was held to be complete, and a recovery against the first carrier fbr
the loss of the goods was reversed.
In Mrriam v. fartford Rail'oad Co., 20 Conn. 354, it was held
that if a common carrier agrees that property intended for transportation by him may be deposited at a particular place without express
notice to him, such deposit alone is a sufficient delivery; and that
such an agreement may be shown by a constant practice and usage
so to receive property without special notice.
The plaintiff contends that the goods were not in the custody and
under the control of the Michigan road, for the reason that the case
states that they "are in a siction of the freight-depot set apart for
the use of the defendant." This is not an accurate statement of
the position. The expression quoted is used incidentally in stating
that when the agent of the Michigan road saw "goods deposited
in the section of the freight-building set apart for the use of the
defendant, destined on the line of said Central Railroad, he would
call upon the agent of defendant, and from a way-bill" obtain a
list of the goods and their destination. Just how and in what
manner it was thus set apart appears from the facts already recited.
It was a portion of the freight-house of the Mlichigan Company,
in which a precise spot was selected or set apart, where the defendant might deposit goods brought on its road, and intended for
transportation over the Michigan road, and which, by usage and
practice and the expectation of the parties, were then under the
control of the Michigan Company, and to be loaded on its cars at
its convenience, without further orders from the defendant.
We are of the opinion that the ruling and direction of the circuit judge, that upon the facts stated the defendant was entitled to
a verdict and judgment in its favor, was correct, and the judgment
should be affirmed.
Sup)reme Judicial Court of Mfaine.
JOHN W. JONES

ET AL.

v. GEORGE BURNITA.MI, Ja.,

ET AL.

If a patentee, in consideration of a royalty, grants to another a license to use
his patent, and the latter does use it, the patentee's right being in litigation and
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that fact known to the licensee, he not having been interfered with, cannot plead
in defence that the invention was not new nor that the patentee was not the first
inventor.
There is a distinction between a license and an assignment of a patent. In the
latter case the patentee, if he has no title, grants nothing, and the consideration
fails. But a license is a grant of the use of whatever the patentee has, and nothing
more.
Where there is no evidence showing or tending to show fraud, it is not error
in the court to decline submitting that question to the jury.

ON exceptions from the Superior Court.
Assumpsit, on a written contract, to recover royalty under a
license, dated August 25th 1874, for the years from 1874 to 1878
inclusive, given by plaintiffs to defendants, upon what are known as,
the " Green corn patents."
The case presented by the plaintiffs was that the defendants
had taken the license from the plaintiffs to make use of letters
patent of the United States, No. 84,928 and No. 85,274, and had
agreed to pay twenty-five cents for every dozen of cans of green
corn packed; and that during the year 1875 the defendants packed
88,830 dozens of cans, for which they refused to pay.
The defences set up, were in substance, these :1. That the letters patent in question were void for want of
novelty, that there was, therefore, no consideration for their agreement to pay license fee.
2. That they had received no .benefit or advantage for their
license, and that there was, therefore, no consideration for their
agreement.
8. That at time of the granting of this license the plaintiffs had
knowledge of certain English letters patent, subsequently held by
the Supreme Court of the United States to anticipate the letters
patent in question; that such knowledge on the part of the
plaintiffs (although shared by the defendants), made this contract
void. by reason of legal fraud.
The counsel for the defendants offered the record in the case of
Jones v. Sewall, to which the plaintiffs' counsel objected.
The presiding judge ruled these defences insufficient, and in the
matter of the offer said: "The precise question, which has been
argued now, is in regard to the admissibility of the record in Jones
v. Sewall. Objection is made upon two grounds: First, that it
is not between the same parties as in this suit; that it is merely
conclusive against Jones, so far as Sewall is concerned; Second,
that the invalidity of the patent is no defence to the present case.

JONES v. BURNIIAM.

237

"In regard to the first ground, I understand the law of this
state to render the record admissible, so far as that objcction is
concerned. It is a suit to which Jones is a party, and where the
question of the invalidity of the patent was directly raised. So
he had an opportunity to be heard upon that question before a
court having jurisdiction. I am aware that formerly there was a
different rule, but I understand the decisions of this state to be
that the record is admissible against Jones in any proceeding to
which he is a party, where the precise question determined by the
court is involved. So that, so far as the first ground of the objection is concerned, I shall rule that the record is admissible.
" It is then claimed that it is immaterial, and affords no defence
to the prosecution of this suit. To determine that' question, I
apprehend it is necessary to consider somewhat, the position of the
parties at the time this contract was made, so far as it appears
from the evidence in the case. I understand it to be conceded that
at the time of the execution of this contract, in August 1874,
this proceeding in equity to determine the validity of the patent,
was then pending, known to all parties to the suit to be pending;
that at that time, the decision of the Circuit Court of the United
States had been rendered, sustaining the patent, which fact was
also known to the parties to this suit. From that decision, appeal
had been taken to t&je Supreme Court of the United States, so that
no final judgment had been rendered. I understand it further to
be conceded, that upon that appeal, final judgment was rendered,
declaring the patent void for want of novelty, but rendered subsequent to the packing of the corn for the year 1875, by the defendants.
"Returning to the date of this agreement, in August 1874, the
plaintiffs were holders of the letters patent, claiming they were
valid.- There were controversies pending, but a preliminary decision had been rendered in favor of the patent itself. Jones was
in the position of a man claiming to have the legal right to, hold
letters patent, and control the manufacture of this patented article.
They were asserting their rights, claiming they were legal and
valid.
"The defendants then were in a position where they could adopt
either one of two courses. They could treat the patent as invalid,
and proceed to manufacture the article in defiance of the patent,
and abide the consequences, whatever they might be.
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"The second course was to make some arrangement with the person holding the apparent legal right to the patent, by which they
could manufacture the article by his consent, without subjecting
themselves to damages in case the patent was sustained. This
course the defendants adopted. They made an agreement by
which they were to pay twenty-five cents a dozen as a royalty to
holders of the patent.
"Leaving out the question of fraud, which is open to the defendants if they propose to establish it by any competent evidence, the
question arises here, whether, under the pleadings, the defence of
want or failure of consideration of the contract has been sustained,
or whether this record of the Supreme Court tends to sustain such
a defence. In my view of the case it does not. " I think the consideration which the defendants received was the right to manufacture the patented article during the year 1875 without fear of
legal proceedings being instituted against them, and purchasers
from them were protected from any litigation. In my judgment,
that is a sufficient legal consideration for the contract itself; and I
shall rule in the absence of proof of notice or any act tending to
terminate the contract, and in the absence of fraud, that corn
packed by the defendants under this process, prior to the decision
of the Supreme Court, must pay the royalty in accordance with the
terms of the agreement.
"I therefore, upon the immediate question, rule that this record
is admissible if the defence propose to connect it with competent
evidence of fraud in the original contract; otherwise not admissible."
After the introduction of further evidence the judge said: "I
shall rule as matter of law, that there is no evidence here of fraud,
no evidence of any facts known to Jones, that were material, that
were. not known to Burnham at the same time; and if known to
both parties there can be no fraud."
The judge then ordered the jury to render a verdict for the
plaintiffs for the full amount claimed. That verdict was for the
plaintiffs, for $8556.16 ; and the defendants alleged exceptions.
A. A. Strout and G. 1. Holmes, for the defendants.
. P. Mattocks and .

W. Fox, for the plaintiffs.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
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C. J.-On the 25th of August 1874, these plaintiffs,

having letters patent of the United States, as assignees of Isaac
Winslow. for certain improvements in Indian corn preserved green,
gave the defendants, who were " desirous of manufitcturing and
selling the product protected by said patent," a license to nlanufacture the patented article in this state " during the remaining
years of the life of the patent," for which, they agreed to pay the
royalty specified in the license, upon all corn packed by them.
They packed during the season of 1875, 33,830 dozen cans, and
this -suit is brought to recover the royalty due by the terms of the
license, on that amount.
The main defence is, that Isaac Winslow, the plaintiffs' assignor
in the letters patent, was not the original and first inventor of the
liatented invention claimed and described therein, and that they
were wholly void. When this license was given, the plaintiffs were
the holders of letters patent issued in due form, and claimed they
were valid. At that time controversies were pending for the purpose of testing their validity. A decision of the Circuit Court of
the United States had been rendered sustaining the patent. The
plaintiffs claimed the right to control the manufacture of the
patented article. All these facts were fully known to the defendants, and with that knowledge they procured their license and
manufactured under it, in preference to manufacturing in defiance
of the patent.
An appeal was entered in the case pending in the Circuit Court,
and upon a hearing before the Supreme Court of the United States,
the decision in the Circuit Court was reversed and the plaintiffs'
patent declared void, for want of novelty: Sewall v. Jones, 1 Otto
171.
The question presented is whether the plaintiffs, under these circumstances, are entitled to recover. The defence set up, is a want
of consideration. Here was a patent. It was prima facie valid.
It had been adjudged valid, by the Circuit Court of the United
States. The plaintiffs had obtained an injunction for an interference with their rights. An appeal bad been taken. The rights of
the parties were in contestation. All this was known to both parThe
ties. Nothing was concealed. Nothing was misrepresented.
defendants were unwilling to incur the risk attendant upon interfering with a latent already adjudged valid by a court of high
authority. They bought a license and proceeded to manufacture.
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They have not been interfered with in their business. They have
obtained all they bargained for, and have never offered to surrender their license, or said they should not manufacture. According to the weight of judicial authority, the plaintiffs are entitled to
recover.
A license is not an assignment of the patent. It is simply a
permission to do certain things under it. In Lawes v. Purser,
6 El. & Bl. 930, which is like the case at bar, Lord CAMPBELL
says, "What then is the plea? Simply that the patent is void;
and, if it could be shown that the patent was, for any reason whatever, invalid, the plea and every allegation in it would be proved.
Then, there having been such an agreement as stated in the
declaration, and permission to use the invention having been enjoyed under it, can it be permitted to the defendants, after such a
contract and such acquiescence on their part in the plaintiffs' claim,
and such enjoyment by them of the invention, to say that they will
not pay the stipulated price because the patent is void, and so to
force the plaintiffs to try his right to the patent in this action at
great disadvantage. I am of opinion that the defendants, not
denying that they have used the invention under the agreement,
cannot set up this defence. This plea would be proved though the
plaintiffs had really made a useful invention, and had taken out a
patent for it, treated by every one as valid and supposed. by all parties to be so, if at the time of the trial it were discovered, for the
first time, that there had been some previous use of the invention,
or some part of it, though utterly unknown both to the plaintiffs
and defendants. It would be monstrous if the defendants after
such an agreement acted upon could, on this ground, refuse payment. No fraud is alleged. No renunciation of the permission,
warning the plaintiffs that the defendants meant to claim to use the
invention in their own right, is averred. I think therefore it would
be contrary to all principle to hold this plea good."
In Smith v. Neale, 2 C. B. N. S. 67, 89, WILLES, J., says:
"In short, the defendant in this case contracted for the plaintiff's
right, such as it was, without regard to whether it could be sustained upon litigation or not; and there is nothing unreasonable
or uncommon in -such a bargain."
In Norton v. Brooks, 7 H. & N. 499, it was held that if a
patentee, in consideration of a royalty, grants to another a license
to use the patent invention, and the latter uses it, he cannot plead
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as a defence to an action for the royalty, that the invention was
not new, or that the patentee was not the first inventor. "So
long as the term of the patent hists, if the defendant chooses to work
under it," remarks POLLOCK, C. B., "he must pay the stipulated
price."
To the same effect are Hall v. C(onder, 2 C. B. N. S. 22; Baird
v. Neilson, 8 Cl. & Fin. 726; Trotman v. Wood, 16 C. B. N. S.
479; Taylor v. Hare, 4 B. & P. 260. In Adie v. Clark, Law
Rep. 2 App. Cas. 423, it was held in the vice-chancellor's court,
that the licensee of a patent cannot dispute its validity.
The decisions in this country are to the same effect. In ltfarsh
v. Dodge, 4 Hun 278, 280, it was held that a licensee must notify
the owner of the patent of his renunciation of the license, before
he can repudiate his obligations under it. " Moreover," remarks
GILBERT, J., "the defendants were estopped to deny that the rakes
were manufactured under the plaintiff's license, so long as they
retained the license itself. They were at liberty to relinquish it at
any time and they were bound to do so, if they intended to deprive
the plaintiff of his royalty." In Marston v. Swett, 66 N. Y. 206,
it was held that the patent being void, there was no consideration
for the royalty ; but upon appeal the decision was overruled. In
delivering the opinion in the court of last resort, EARL, J., says:
"Here wiis no fraud and the defendants got all they bargained for.
During the time mentioned in the complaint, they enjoyed all
they could have had, if the patent had been valid." Tending to
the same result, are the cases of Johnson v. Willimantic Linen
Co., 33 Conn. 436; Wilder v. Adams, 2 Woodb. & M. 331;
Kinhsman v. Parkhurst,18 How. 289.
It is well settled, that a note given in consideration of a sale of
a patent, or of an interest in the same, where the patent has been
adjudged void for want of novelty, cannot be enforced. In that
the grantor grants a monopoly of the use of the patent; but if he
has none he grants nothing. In the case of a license, the licensor
grants the use of what he has and nothing more, and that without
warrant. In the one case he grants a right which does not existin the other he g ants whatever right he may. have, be the same
more or less.
The counsel have referred us to Saxton v. Dodge, 57 Barb. 84;
but that case may be regarded as overruled by the Court of Appeals in lliarstonv. Swett, 66 N. Y. 206, or if it be sustained, it is
VOL. XXVI.-31
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upon the ground of fraud and misrepresentation, and that the
defendant failed to get what he bargained for.
It is objected that the question of fraud was not submitted to
the jury. But there was nothing to submit. The defendants' own
testimony negatives that. They knew the patent was in litigation.
They wanted such right as the plaintiffs could give them, and
obtained it and retained it. It is not the duty of the court to submit the question of fraud to the jury, when the defendants' testimony negatives its existence; and when, if the jury without and
against evidence had found it, it would be their imperative duty to
set such verdict aside.
The defendants by their letter of 1st November 1875, gave an
account of the corn packed by them during the season of 1875.
The letter assumes that the packing was all done under their license.
They set up no allegation of any other packing than under the
plaintiffs' patent. The claim was not made before the jury. Had
the defendants desired to raise any such issue, it should have been
at the time. The verdict, as we understand it, is upon the amount
returned by the defendants and to the payment of which the only
,objection taken is the invalidity of the patent.
Exceptions overruled.
DICKERSON, BARROWS, DANFORTIH, VIRGIN and LIBBEY, JJL,
concurred.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.
MORRIS TYLERET

AL. V. WILLIAM

HAMERSLEY,

STATE'S ATToRNxEy.

The adjudication of contempt by a court of competent jurisdiction where the
prooeeding is according to the common law practice, is final and cannot be reTiewed by a court of error.
But 'when the question of contempt is tried upon an issue of law tendered by
the party moving in the proceeding and decided upon such issue, the decision
must be regarded as a judgment upon which a writ of error may be brought.
A writ of error though operating in ordinary cases as a supersedeas of execution from the date of its service does not have that effect in the case of a peremptory mandamus.
Especially does it not have that effect when the errors assigned have already
been before the court and have been decided.
The Superior Court issued a peremptory writ of mandamus, upon the advice of the
Supreme Court, upon a reservation of the case for its advice. Before it was served
a writ of error was brought to reverse the judgment by which it was granted.
The wriztof mandamus was subsequently served upon the defendants, but they
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refused to obey it, and the court, on motion of the plaintiff, committed them for contempt. JIdd, to be no error.

Tim facts of the case are sufficiently stated in the opinion.

1B. -D. Hubbard and 0. -. Perkins, for the plaintiffs in error.
TV. H1amersley, State's Attorney, and J. .. Buck, contra.
The opinion of the -court was delivered by
HovEY, J.-This writ of error is founded upon an adjudication
of a contempt in refusing obedience to a peremptory writ of mandamuis. The writ of mandamus was awarded and issued by the
Superior Court sitting at Hartford, in accordance with advice given
by this court after a full hearing and argument upon a reservation.
It was directed to the New Haven and Northampton Company, a
railroad corporation created by the laws of this state, of which the
plaintiffs in error were directors and officers, and commanded them
forthwith and thereafter to stop their regular passenger and freight
trains at the depot at Plantsville on their railroad, for the purpose
of receiving and discharging passengers and freight. Before it
was served a writ of error was brought to this court to reverse the
judgment by which the mandamus was awarded. The writ of mandamus was afterwards served upon the railroad corporation, and the
plaintiffs in error were duly informed thereof, and also had due
notice of the contents of the writ. But they refused to obey its
mandate, on the ground that counsel had advised them that it was
superseded by a writ of error. Proceedings were then had in the
Superior Court against the plaintiffs in error to enforce their obedience to the writ of mandamus, and upon those proceedings they
were adjudged guilty of contempt and ordered to be attached and
committed to the county jail in Hartford, and to be confined and
imprisoned therein till discharged by order of this court or otherwise by due process of law. It was also adjudged that they should
pay the costs of the proceedings, and that unless they should forthwith and within twenty days after notice of the order was served
upon them obdy the writ of mandamus and make return of the
same to the court, process should issue against them. Notice having been served upon them, they brought the present writ of error
to this court; and the defendant in error moves that it be struck
from the docket.
Upon this motion the question which presents itself is whether a
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writ of error will lie upon an adjudication of contempt. Writs of
error may by statute be brought to this court upon judgments of
the Superior Court, and such writs in all cases in which they will
li at common law, are -writs of right unless, the questions raised
by the assignments of error have been already determined by this
court upon a reservation. But at common law no writ of error lies
except upon a judgment, or an award in the nature of a judgment:
Co. Litt. 288 ; 2 Tidd 1062. It was accordingly held in the case of
the City of London, 8 Co. 288, that upon a return to a habeas corpus,
no issue could be joined or a demurrer taken and that no writ of
error would lie thereon. In the case of The King v. The Dean
ad Chapter of Trinity Chapel in Dublin, 1 Stra. 536 (s. c. 8
Mod. 27), the doctrine of the case of The City of London was
fully recognised. In the opinions given by the judges, it was declared that error would not 'lie upon the award of a procedendo or on
the return of a rescue : and FORTESCUE, J.,'stated his belief that
on a conviction for contempt error was never brought. In Groencrelt v. Burwell, 1 Salk. 144 (s. c. 1 Ld. Raym. 454), Lord IIOLT,
who gave the opinion, admitted it to be good law that no writ of
error would lie upon the award of a fine and imprisonment for a
contempt.
These cases are sufficient to show that at common law adjudications of contempts by courts of competent jurisdiction are final and
cannot be reviewed in a court of error, and the doctrine is strongly
supported by numerous other authorities, English and American:
Earl of Shaftesbury's Case, 2 St. Tri. 615, 1 Mod. 144; The
Queen v. Paty et al., 2 Ld. Raym. 1105; Th e King v. Crosby,
3 Wils. 188 ; Carus Wilson's Case, 7 A. & E. (N. S.) (53 E. C.
L. R.) 984; -Ex parte Pater, 5 B. & S. (117 E. C. L. R.) 299;
State v. Powle, 42 N. I. 540; -Exyarte Kearney, 7 Wheat. 88;
Yates v. Lansing, 9 Johns. 395; 4 Id. 317 ; In re Williamson,
26 Penna. St. 9 ; Ex parte Summers, 5 Ired. 149; State v. Woodfin, Id. 199 ; State v. White, T. U. P. Charlton 123 ; Gates v.
MeDaniel, 4 Stew. & Port. 69; MHoore v. Clerk of Jessamine,
Litt. Select Cas. 104; State v. Tipton, 1 Blackford 166; Kernodle v. Cason, 25 Ind. 862; Clark v. The People, 1 Breese 266;
State v. Mott, 4 Jones Law (N. C.) 449; Johnston v. Commonwealth, 1 Bibb 598; Ex parte Adams, 25 Miss. 883; Martin's
Case, 5 Yerg. 456; Watson v. Williams, 36 Miss. 831; First
Cong. Church v. Muscatine, 2 Clark (Iowa) 69. If, therefore, the
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petition for the attachment in this case had been proceeded with
and the adjudication complained of by the plaintiffs in error had
been made in the form and according to the rules of the common
law, we should feel compelled to strike the case from the docket,
because by those rules, there would have been no judgment or
award in the nature of a judgment on which a writ of error would
lie. But the parties and the court proceeded with the petition as
though it was an original suit, distinct from and independent of the
proceedings upon which the peremptory mandamus was awarded,
and accordingly on the coming in of the return, the defendant in
error formally demurred to the matters contained in it, and the
court made the adjudication upon the demurrer.
Ia view of these circumstances, the counsel for the plaintiffs in
error contended that the adjudication must be regarded and treated
as a judgment, and that a writ of error lies upon it. And the
claim is strongly supported by a decision of the Supreme Court of
Vermont. -In re Jesse Cooper, 32 Vt. 253. That case arose
upon a habeas corpus. Cooper, the relator, had been fined by a
justice of the peace for a contempt in his presence while holding
a court, and had been committed to jail for non-payment of the
fine. He brought a habeas corpi.s before the county court to test
the validity of his imprisonment. The jailer made a return, to
.which the relator demurred; and the county court decided that
the imprisonment of the relator was not unlawful and remanded
him. The record was then brought before the Supreme Court for
revision, and that court held, that as the return was demurred to,
and issue joined upon he demurrer, the decision could be revised
on habeas corpus.
The ground upon which this decision was made is indeed teclnical, but it does not differ in that respect from the decision in the
case of I'he King v. The Dean, and Chapter of Irinity ChIurclh
in Dublin. That case was twice argued before it was decided.
Upon the first argument the judges were divided upon the question
whether the award of a peremptory mandamus upon motion, and
without pleadings or demurrer joined, was a judgment of which
error could be predicated. The chief justice was in doubt about it.
FORTESCUE, J., thought it hard to maintain that an award which did
not contain the words "ide o consideratunt est" was a judgment on
which a writ of error would lie. Powis, J., seemed to be of the
same opinion; and EYRE, J., thought that the award was a judg-
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ment on which error would lie because the writ recited that the
return was held insufficient "per quod con8ideraturn fuit, quod
fierit breve de peremptorie mandamus, tarn in complemento judici
quam in executione ejusdem." On the second argument all the
judges agreed, but for different reasons mostly technical, that a
writ of error would not lie. It was, however, admitted that if the
mandamus had been awarded upon an issue joined, either of law or
of fact, the results would have been different. With such a precedent as that case furnishes, the decision In -re Je8se Cooper canhot well be discarded because of the technical character of the
reasons assigned for it by the court. And while I would not adopt
it as a rule of procedure and thus open the way to this court for
writs of error in cases of contempt generally, because, in general,
every court must be allowed to judge of its own contempts; yet
where parties proceed as the parties proceeded in this case and try
the question of contempt upon an issue of law tendered by the
party moving in the proceeding, and the court decides the question
upon that issue, the d6cision must be regarded and treated, not as
an award merely, but as a judgment upon which a writ of error
will lie.
The motion to strike the case from the docket must therefore be
denied.
This disposition of the motion of the defendant in error brings
before us the proceedings in the court below and imposes upon us
a delicate and important duty. In performing that duty, the first
question to be considered is how are the rights of the plaintiffs in
error affected by the writ of error and to what extent can the proceedings upon which the writ is founded be considered and reviewed
in this court.
The answer seems to me to be obvious. Brought here as this
writ of error is, by an unusual method of procedure and for the
double purpose of staying execution and obtaining a revision of
questions which are not ordinarily revisable in a court of error, it
should give to the plaintiffs in error no right and secure to them
no benefit or privilege to which they would not have been entitled,
after commitment, upon a writ of habeas corpus. In the first place
the writ of error should not have the effect" of staying execution
upon the judgment. Should such an effect be given to it, parties
guilty of the grossest and most aggravated contempt may set the
courts at defiance, obstruct the regular course of justice, and sus-
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pend if not totally elude punishment at their own will and pleasure.
Contempts are offences at common law against the court as an
organ of public justice. The right of punishing them is inherent
in all courts and is essential for their protection and cxistencc.
From their very nature the punishment, to be effectual, niust be
immediate and peremptory, and not subject to suspension at the
mere will of the offender. Sentences for contenpts would amount
to nothing if the offenders could supersede them by writs of error,
and the authority of courts would be contemptible indeed, if it could
be thus eluded and prostrated: 4 Bla. Coi. 286, 2 Sw. Dig.
358 ; .Exparte 1fadsby, 13 Md. 625 ; Er parte Summers, 5 Ired.
149 ; Johnston v. Commomnealth, 1 Bibb 598.
In the second place, the proceedings upon which the judgment
was rendered should not be reviewed except so far as may be necessary to determine whether the court in rendering the judgment
acted within the sphere of its jurisdiction. Every court nmust of
necessity possess the power to enforce obedience to its lawful orders
and judgments and punish contempts of all kinds against its authority. It is only when it acts without its jurisdiction that its
proceedings in such cases will be interfered with or questioned by
a superior tribunal. The principle upon which courts proceed in
such cases is clearly stated in the celebrated case of Burdett v. Abbott, 14 East 1, 150, and the case of The People v. Sturtev'at, 5
Seld. 263. In the former case, Lord ELLEKBOROUGII, in the course
of an able and interesting opinion, observed that if a cormitment
appeared to be for a contempt of the House of Commons generally,
he would neither in the case of that court or of any other superior
court inquire further; but if it did not profess to commit for a contempt, but for some matter which could by no reasonable intendment be considered as a contempt of the court committing, but a
ground of commitment palpably and evidently arbitrary, unjust and
contrary to every principle of positive law or natural justice, he
would look at it and act upon it as justice might require, from
whatever court it might profess to have proceeded. In the case of
The Peop)le v. Sturtevant, the rule laid down by the court was
that "a party proceeded against for disobedience to an order or
judgment, is never allowed to allege as a defence for his misconduct that the court erred in its judgment. He must go further and
make out that in point of law there was no order and no disobedience
by showing that the court had no right to judge between the parties
on the subject."
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The question then arises whether the proceedings in the court
below were within the jurisdiction of that court. The record shows
that before those proceedings were commenced, a writ of error had
been brought upon the judgment by which the writ of mandamus
was awarded and was then pending in this, court. And it was
urged in argument by counsel for the plaintiffs in error, that that
writ of error was a supersedeas of the writ of mandamus and operated as a sty of all proceedings for the enforcement of that writ.
If this claim is sustainable the court below had no jurisdiction of'
the proceedings in which the contempt was adjudicated, and its
entire action, including the judgment rendered thereon, was coram
non judee and therefore void: Kendall v. Wilkinson, 4 E. & B.
680. And it would follow as a necessary consequence that no
obligation rested upon the plaintiffs in error or upon the corporation
to which the writ of mandamus was directed, to stop their .trains
at Plantsville as the writ commanded; and their refusal to obey
the mandate was an innocent and justifiable act. But the claim is
entirely without foundation. It is undoubtedly a rule of the common law, well settled and established, that a writ of *error after
final judgment and before execution executed is, in ordinary cases,
a supersedeas of the execution from the time of its allowance, and
by our law it is a supersedeas from the date of the service of the
writ. But it is no supersedeas of a peremptory mandamus. In
the first rlace,. no return to such a writ is allowed, the courts exacting implicit obedience to its mandate; and such obedience is
required during the entire period that the judgment by which it
was awarded remains in force and unreversed : High on Extr. Rem.,
§ 567; Kaye v. Kean, 18 B. Mon. 839. In the second place,
the judicial decisions in England and in this country, generally,
expressly hold that a writ of error does not operate as a supersedeas to stay the execution of a peremptory mandamus; .Anonynous, 1 Ventr. 266; Strode v. Palmer, Trin. T. 2 Geo. I. ; Sill.
Ent. 248; The -Deanand Clapter of Trinity Chapel in -Dublin
v. Dougatt, 1 IPeere Wins. 349; Wight v. Sharpe, 11 Mod.
175; Lord Montague v. Dudman, 2 Yes. Sr. 396; The People
v. Steele, Edw.' Sel, Cas. 505; 2 Barb. 554; Phickney v. Henegan, 2 Strob. 250. But we do not choose to rest our decision of
this question upon these grounds alone.
There is another reason, which is perfectly conclusive in this
case, why the writ of error cannot be allowed to operate as a super-
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sedeas.

A writ of error is never allowed to have that operation,

after the questions raised by the assignment of errors haN e been

determined: Arnold v. Fuler, 1 Ohio 458; Bishop qf OLhory's
Case, Cro. Jae. 534. See also liartop v. Ilartop, 1 Ld. Rayin. 97,
98. In this case all the questions raised by the assignment of errors
bad been determined by this court upon a reservation -by the
Superior Court, before the writ of error was brought. By the
rules of this court, that determination settled and established the
law of the case and was final; and the judgment which followed
in the Superior Court was as conclusive and binding upon the parties as if it bad been rendered originally by the Superior Court
and afterwards affirmed on error by this court: Smith v. Lewis. 26
Conn. 110; Nichols v. Bridgeport, 2T I(. 459; Towler v. Bi.:71p,
32 Id. 199. The peremptory mandamus was, therefore, wholly
unaffected by the writ of error, and was in full force from the
moment it was issued. The plaintiffs in error as officers of tle
corporation to which the mandamus was directed, were bound to
see that the mandate was obeyed. They chose a different course,
and in so doing were guilty of a gross contempt of the authority
of the court. The reasons assigned in their behalf furnish no
excuse for their misconduct, and cannot under the circumstances
be received in palliation of their contempt.
"There is no error in the judgment complained of, and it is
affirmed.
Supreme Court of Aew York.

First Department.

SAMUEL NEWELL, EXECUTOR, r. JOSEPH RIDGWAY ET AL.
Where several persons lose their lives by the same event there is no presumption
of law as to survivorship based upon age or sex, nor is there any presumption that

they all died at the same moment. The law makes no presumption on the subject
bat leaves the survivorship to be determined as a fact by evidence, and the burden
of proof is on the party asserting the affirmative.
Where a devise in remainder is limited to take effect upon a condition or contingency to a preceding estate, and that preceding estate shoutld not arise, the remainder over will vest, as the first estate is taken as a preceding limitation and
not as a condition.
A. devised her estate to trustees upon a separate trust as to each of her two
children to pay the income to such child during his life, and upon hi- death tile
principal to go to the heirs of his body, and in default of such heirs then to tile
heirs of the body of testatrix then living, and in default of any such heirs of the
body of testatrix then to the children or heirs of B., C., 1). and E.. dischargred
of all further trust. Testatrix and her two children, both unmarried and without
VoL. XXVI-32
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issue, perished by shipwreck by the same disaster. Hdd, 1. That in the absence
of any evidence of survivorship among testatrix and her children there could be
no title in the heirs or next of kin of the testatrix or of either of the children,
which could prevail against the heirs of B., C., D. and E. as remaindermen under
the will. Held, 2. That the children or heirs of B., C., D., and E. took per stirpes.
To constitute an equitable conversion by will of real estate into personal, in the
absence of an actual sale, it must be made the duty and be obligatory upon the
trustees to ,ell
; a mere discretionary power to sell is not sufficient.

Tiis was an action by the executor and trustees under the will
of Elizabeth Ml. Walter, by which, among other things, they sought
that it be determined whether the mother, husband and children of
the testatrix perished at the same time, or whether either and which
of them survived the others, and the order in which they died;
whether, as matter of law, either, and which, of said persons iiherited from the other, and whether the children or heirs of Frederick Ridgway, Moses Ridgway, John and Henry Gunn, take per
capita or per stirpes, and in what proportion or shares, or how and
to whom the estate shall pass under the will.
The tcstatrix, Elizabeth Al. Walter, died October 7th 1870. She
left surviving her husband, Charles W. Walter, and two children,
Mary R. W.,alter and Joseph K. Walter, both infants under the age
of twenty-one. Mary Ridgway, the mother of the testatrix, also
survived her. The mother, husband and two children of the testatrix were passengers on the steamship "Schiller," which sailed
from the city of New York, on a voyage to Europe, on April 27th
1875. The ship sunk and was lost on May 7th 1875, near the
Scilly Islands, England, and all the persons above named were lost
inthe catastrophe. The mother was about sixty-nine years of age;
the husband forty-five. The daughter, Mary R., was about ten
years, and the son, Joseph R., about seven years of age. There
was no evidence that there was any survivorship among the four
persons named.
In and by her last will and testament, bearing date June 18th
1870, the testatrix devised and bequeathed her residuary estate,
both real and personal, to her trustees named, of whom her husband was one, in fee, in trust, however, to set apart, sell, mortgage,
or otherwise dispose of the same as they might deem advisable, and
to invest the proceeds so as to make two funds of $15,000 each,
and one fund of $30,000, to be held by them in trust. The income
of one of said funds of $15,000 to be paid by the trustees semiannually to the daughter of the testatrix during her natural life;
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the principal of the fund to be paid at her death to the heirs of her
daughter's body then living, and in default of such heirs living, to
whom the daughter might appoint by her last will and testament,
discharged of all further trust; and in default of heirs of the
daughter's body living at her death, or of any appointment, the
remainder over to the heirs of the body of the testatrix then living;
and in default of heirs of the body of the testatrix living at the
time of her daughter's deathl-the remainder over to the cbihlren or
heirs of Frederick A. Ridgway, Moses Ridgway, John Gunn and
Henry Gunn, discharged of all further trust.
The income of the other fund of $15,000 was devised to the
trustees upon the same terms, substituting only the testatrix's son
instead of her daughter.
The income of the fund of $80,000 was to be paid by the trustees semi-annually to the husband of the testatrix during his natural
life; the principal of the fund to be paid at his death to the heirs
of the body of the testatrix then living; and in default of heirs of
her body living at the time of her husband's death, the remainder
over to the children or heirs of Frederick A. Ridgway, Moses
Ridgway, John Gunn and Henry Gunn.
The ultimate remaindermen under the will, and the heirs and
next of kin of the testatrix and of the children were made parties
defendant.
The following opinion was delivered at the special term by
J.-Whether the remainder over to the children or
heirs of Frederick A. Ridgway, Moses Ridgway and John and
Henry Gunn has become wholly legally vested in them in possession, depends upon the determination of the question as to whether
or not. there was any survivorship between the two children, the
mother and husband of the testatrix, who were drowned with the
sinking of the steamship " Schiller." If they all died in the
same moment, then neither the children nor the testatrix left heirs
of their bodies living, and the remainders in question in their entirety, by the express terms of the will, vest in the children or
heirs of the persons above named. Questions of doubt and perplexity have often arisen with regard to the title to property and
the distribution of estates where several persons, upon the survivorship of one of whom the question rested, have perished in the same
calamity, such as a shipwreck or battle, and where there was no
evidence as to who died first.
VAN VORST,
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The civil law considers questions of this nature and has eliunciated certain rules, deduced from probabilities arising from the
age and difference of sex of the parties. If the persons perishing
were under fifteen, the eldest was presumed to survive. If all were
above sixty, the youngest was presumed to have survived. The
French code recognises presumptions of sur'vivorship growing out
of the ages and sex of persons perishing in a common disaster: 2
Kent's Com. 435, and notes; 2 Best on Ev., § 410, and 1 Greenl.
on Ev., § 29; where the references to the French and civil law
are collected.
The code of Louisiana following the civil law has adopted fixed
rules upon this subject: Civil Code of La., §§ 980-983.
By tile law of India, where relatives perish thus together, it is
presumed that they all died at the same moment and the property
of each passes to his living heirs, without any portion of it vesting
in his companions in misfortune: Baillie's Law of 'Inheritance
172.
By the Civil Code of Holland, § 878, in the absence of evidence,
the presumption is, that all persons die together at the same
moment and that there is no transmission or succession from one in
favor of the other.
The English common law has never adopted these provisions.
It requires the survivorship of two or more persons to be established by facts and not by any arbitrary rule or prescribed presumption.
It would seem to be unsafe to rely upon any presumption arising either from age or sex with regard" to survivorship of per'son§
exposed to a common peril by the sinking of a ship. It is true,
that one might by strength and powers of endurance survive the
other, but the strongest might perish first. Experience in such
cases shows that no rule can be unalterably adopted to determine
survivorship: Vide the numerous cases cited in Beck's Medical
Jurisprudence, on the "presumption of survivorship," which the
author considers "an intricate" question. These cases show the
inherent difficulty of reaching any*rule upon this subject, in the
entire absence of evidence, although, in the end, the learned author
is inclined to the conclusion, that the provisions of the French code,
with some modifications, appear to be best adapted for administering equitably in the majority of cases that may occur: 1 Beck's
Med. Jur., 12th ed., ch. x., p. 642.
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The subject Wa3 considered in The King v. Defay, 1 W. B1.
640, s. c. 4 Burr. 2295. General Stanwix, his second wife and a
daughter by a former wife, perished in a vessel lost at sea. No account of the manner of the perishing was ever received. Application
was made for the granting of letters of administration of the effects
of the general, to his nephew and next of kin, on an allegation that
there were no living children, wife or other relative in the same or
any nearer degree. The maternal uncle and next of kin to the daughter, claimed the effects, under a notion of the civil law, that where
parent and child perish together, and the manner of the death is
unknown, the child shall be presumed to survive the parent. The
court sustained the nephew's claim upon the ground of its being
for the administration -only, and not for the distribution of the
estate. An interesting argument in support of the claims of the
contestants is found in Fearne's Posth. Works, p. 38.
In Wright v. Samada, 2 Salk. 593, S. c. 2 Phillimore 266, note
c, one Netherwood made a will, leaving his wife his residuary legatee. He gave her also'his real estate for life, and appointed Samada
his executor. His wife died, leaving three children by him. In
1779, he married the sister of his first wife and had issue, one son.
In 1791, Netherwood, his wife and son were lost in a vessel that had
foundered at sea. Probate of the will was granted to Samada, who
was afterward called upon to prove it, or show cause why the probate
should not be revoked, and administration granted to the next of
kin of the deceased, as having died intestate. It was claimed on
the behalf of the next of kin of the father and husband, that the
subsequent marriage and birth of the child revoked the will, and
that the presumption was, that the husband and father survived.
Sir WILLIAM WYNNE said: "I always thought it the most
natural presumption that all died together, and that none could
transmit rights to another. Then what are the circumstances at
his death ? He had neither wife nor children. Therefore there is
nothing to raise the implication of revocation at that time. Therefore, taking into consideration that there was no wife or child at
his death, I pronounce for the will."
In Taylor v. Diploch, 2 Phillimore 261, Taylor and his wife perished in a vessel wrecked in Falmouth harbor. The husband left a
will constituting his wife executrix and residuary legatee. A question arose whether the relatives of the husband or wife were entitled
tb the residue. The brothers and sisters of the husband on the one
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side, and the mother of the wife on the other side prayed administration with the will annexed. The counsel for the next of kin of
the husband claimed that the burthen is thrown on the adverse part,
to show that there ever was a moment of time in which the property vested in the wife.
Sir JoHn
ICOLL held that the burthen was on the person claiming derivatively from the residuary legatee (the wife) to show that
the testator left a residuary legatee; that the next of kin of the
residuary legatee is to show that the wife survived the husband.
In commenting upon the evidence, the court stated: "There is no
evidence direct as to this point-some inferences have been adduced.
It is stated that the two bodies were found together. This tends
to show that they were in the same situation at the time of death.
Upon the whole I am not satisfied that proof is adduced that the
wife survived. Taking it to be that both died togethier, the administration is due to the representatives of the husband.
"I assume they both perished in the same moment, and therefore I grant the administration to the representatives of the husband. I am not deciding that the husband survived the wife."
In Colvin v. ProcuratorGeneral, 1 Hagg. Ec. R. 92, administration of the goods of an intestate, drowned together with his wife
and only child, was granted to a creditor of the husband, on the
presumption that the husband survived, the debt being large and
the property small.
in the Matter of the Goods of Henry Seluyn, 3 Hagg. Ec. R.
748, the husband and wife, having been drowned together, the
court, the wife's next of kin not opposing, granted probate in common form of the husband's will, to the executors substituted in the
event of her dying in his lifetime, the will naming her executrix
if living at his decease. PER CURIAM : "Instances have occurred
where, under similar circumstances, the question has been, which
of the two survived; but in the absence of clear evidence it has
generally been taken that both died in the same moment." Taylor
v. Diploch supra, was cited in support of this conclusion.
In the Matter of the Goods of Bobert Murray, 1 Curteis 596, a
husband, his wire and child having perished together, administration was granted of the husband as having died a widower. The
husband left a will in which he had bequeathed the whole of his
property to his wife. The court, on motion, granted administration,
with the will annexed, to the next of kin of the husband, there
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being nothing fo show that the wife survived, the next of kin of
the wife consenting.
In Satterthwaite v. Powell, 1 Curt. 705, where husband and
wife were drowned by the same accident, it was held that the presumption is that they died at the same time, and that in order to
entitle the next of kin of the husband to the wife's property it
must be shown that he survived her. Sir HERBERT JENNER said:
"The principle has been frequently acted upon, that when a man
dies possessed of. property that the right to that property passes
to his next of kin, unless it be shown to have passed to another by
survivorship. Here the next of kin of the husband claim the property which was vested in the wife. That claim must be made out.
The parties must be presumed to have died at the same time, and
there being nothing to show that the husband survived the wife,
the administration must pass to her next of kin."
In 11fann v. Mann, I Meriv. 308, an issue was directed to try
whether the son was living at the death of the testator, his father,
the father and son having been shipwrecked and having perished
together, it being held that there was no legal presumption of survivorship: .Durantv. Priend, 5 DeGex & S. 343.
But by far the fullest consideratiou has been given to this subject
in Underwood v. Wing, 19 Beav. 459, and on appeal before the
chancellor and two law judges: 4 DeGex, M. & G. 633.
TMr.
Underwood devised his real and personal estate to the defendant Wing, his heirs, &c., &c., in trust for his wife, her heirs,
&c., &c., absolutely. But the will provided that in case the wife
should die in her husband's lifetime, then he directed that his
real and personal estate should be held by his trustee upon trust
for such of his children as should attain the age of twenty-one
years, to be equally divided among them, share and share alike ; and
in case all his children should die under twenty-one then the property was given to William Wing. The testator appointed his wife
and Wing executrix and executor. MNrs. Underwood devised and
bequeathed all her estate, real and personal, to her husband, his
heirs, &c., &c., absolutely; and her will proceeded in these words:
"(Subject to the estates and interests of my children therein, under
and by virtue of the will of John Tully, deceased), and in case my
said husband shall die in my lifetime, then I devise, bequeath and
appoint the said hereditaments," &c., &c., "unto and to the use
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of William Wing, his heirs," &c., &c. The testatrix appointed her
husband and Wing executors.
Underwood, his wife and their three children embarked on a ship
for Australia, which foundered at sea, and, with the exception of
one sailor, all on board, including Mr. and Mrs. Underwood and
their two sons, were washed into the ocean by the same wave. The
daughter survired, but perished a short time afterward. All the
children died under twenty-one, unmarried. Wing proved the wills
of 'Mr. and Mrs. Underwood. The plaintiff obtained letters of
administration of the daughter, the surviving child.
'Plaintiff insisted that Mr. and Mrs. Underwood aied simultaneously, and that the event had not happened on which Mrs. Underwood had bequeathed her property to Mr. Wing; that Mrs. Underwood died intestate as to her interest in her separate property, and
it belonged to the plaintiff as administrator of the surviving
daughter. Plaintiff also contended that the limitations and bequests
in the will of Mr. Underwood, for the benefit of Wing, were wholly
contingent and depended upon the event which it was insisted had
not happened-of Mrs. Underwood dying in the lifetime of her husband; and that, under the circumstances, the clear residue of Mr.
Underwood's personal estate belonged to the estate of his daughter,
as his sole next of kin surviving him.
It was claimed on the behalf of the defendant Wing, that Mr.
Underwood survived his wife, and that her property passed, in the
first instance, to the husband, and afterward passed, together with
the husband's property, to the defendant Wing.
The Master of the Rolls, among other things, said: "All the
reported cases concur in this, that in such a state of things it is
impossible for the court to come to any conclusion as to which died
first. The result is, that it being impossible, in the absence of
any evidence on the subject, to come to the conclusion that one died
before the other, no decision can be formed on the assumption that
either was the survivor. My opinion is that I must consider that
there is no evidence to show me who is the survivor, and the conclusion of law is; that I cannot found any decision on the assumption
that either was the survivor. The result is, that I think the defendant has not made out that the contingency has arisen on which his
title depends, and I must make a decree accordingly."
Upon appeal the judgment of the Master of the Rolls was'
affirmed.
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It was there decided that the question of survivorship is the subject of evidence to be produced before the tribunal which is to
decide upon it, and which is to determine it as any other fact, and
that there was no evidence to show whether the husband or the
wife was the survivor.
. The chancellor, Lord CRANWORTH, on the appeal, said: "I
think the principle once being admitted, that the prima facie title
is in the next of kin, it must rest on the person who claims the
property, under a bequest giving it to him, in that particular
event. It is not for the next of kin to show that the wife did not
die in her husband's lifetime; but that the person who claims
under the disposition mustshow, not that probably it might be one
way or the other, but that that state of circumstances (lid in fact
occur which entitles him, according to the language of the will, to
say that the wife did die in her husband's lifetime."
And in Wing v. Angrave, 8 H. L. Cases, after full examination,
the judgment in Underwood v. Wing was approved, and the principle of the decision distinctly affirmed.
I have been thus careful to examine and collect together these
cases from the English courts, so as to deduce the rule of law applicable to cases of this character. And I conclude that they
establish that there is no presumption of law arising from age or
sex as to the survivorship among persons whose death is occasioned
by one and the same cause; nor is there any presumption that they
all died at the same time, and that the burden of proof is on the
one asserting the affirmative.
The result is well stated by Mr. Best, in his Principles of Evidence: "When, therefore, a party, on whom lies the onus of proving the survivorship of one individual over another, has no other evidence than the assumption that, from age or sex, one individual
must have struggled longer against death than his companion, he
cannot succeed.
"But, on the other hand, it is not correct to suppose that the
law presumes both to have perished at the same moment. This
would be essentially an artificial presumption against manifest probability."
And the American cases, limited in number, are substantially to
the same effect: Coye v. Leach, 8 Metc. 371; Smith v. Groom, 7
Fla. 81-180; Pell v. Ball, 1 Cheves (Equity) 99; Robinson v.
VOL. XXVI.-33
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Gallier, 2 Wood C. C. 178; N. Y. Legal Observer, vol. 3 (1845),
p. 269.
In the case of Moehring v. Hitchell, 1 Barb. Ch. 270, the only
New York case to which I have been referred, or which I have been
able to find on this subject, the chancellor says upon a certain contingency: "It would have been unnecessary, perhaps, to inquire
whether there i any legal presumption that the husband survived
the wife when they have both perished by the same disaster, and
when there is no extrinsic evidence to guide the judgment of the
court upon this matter of fact ;" but in the case before him he said
it was unnecessary "to inquire whether it must be presumed that
the husband survived his wife."
The chancellor cites the cases of Taylor v. Diloch, Colvin v.
The King's Procurator, and Selwyn's Case, 8upra, as favoring a
legal presumption in such case in favor of the survivorship of the
husband, upon the presumed ground "that the greater strength of
the male would probably enable him to sustain life the longest in
such a calamity."
But a close examination of those cases shows that their disposition
did not turn upon any such legal presumption, but, in reality, upon
a failure of satisfactory evidence to establish a survivorship in -fact.
And as far as Silleek v. Booth, 1 Y. & C. C. C. 117, favors any
presumption of survivorship arising from age or sex, it must be
considered as overruled by Underwood v. Wing, and Wing v.
Angrave, supra, which embrace the most thorough and satisfactory
examination of this question. In the case at bar, there being no
legal presumption of survivorship, no rights could have been transmitted by one child to the other, nor to his or her heirs or next of
kin, and under the authorities above cited the burthen of establishing
a survivorship rests upon the party who claims any portion of the
estate through such fact.
The real contention in this case, as developed on the trial, and
in the argument of the counsel for the respective parties, involves
the principal sum of the three trust funds, directed to be invested
for the children and husband of the testatrix. Those claiming as
next of kin and heirs of the two children of the testatrix, as well
as those claiming to stand in the same relation to the testatrix herself, are before the court. The personal representatives, next of
kin and heirs at law of the two children, on the one band, and on
the other, the children of Frederick A. Ridgway and Moses Ridg-
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way and the heirs of John and Henry Gunn, make claims radically
conflicting. The claim of the latter is under the will of the testatrix
by which the remainder over, in default of heirs of the bodies of the
children, and of the testatrix, living at the time of the death of the
children respectively, is devised and bequeathed to them.
The claim of the heirs and personal representatives of the two
children of the testatrix, is interposed in opposition to the will, and.
upon the supposed ground of intestacy as to the property in question,
upon the deaths of tile two children. And here they are met by
those claiming as heirs at law and next of kin of the testatrix herself,
who, in such event, affirmatively claim the estate.
If the claim of the heirs at law and personal representatives of
either of the two children, be founded upon the notion that one
child left the other surviving, as the living heir of the body of the
testatrix, and as such, entitled to the share held in trust for the
life of the deceased child, the onus of proving the fact of such survivorship would doubtless rest upon the party affirming such fict.
But the claim made by tte representatives of the two children
and their heirs at law is, that upon the death of the testatrix the
whole estate embraced in the trust descended to and vested in the
two children, as her sole heirs at law, and remained so vested,
subject to the execution of the trusts or powers created and imposed
for the life of each, which estate for lives terminated at the death
of the children, and that the burthen is cast upon the remaindermen
to prove the happening of the events or contingencies, or the existence of the defaults which entitle them or any of them to the whole
or any part of the estate. In other words, that it is cast upon them
to prove, not an affirmative fact of survivorship, but rather a negative, that there was in fact as to the children, no survivorship. For
if there was no survivorship, if both children perished in the same
moment, then there was no living heir remaining of the body of the
testatrix. This involves a construction of the will.
It seems reasonably clear, under the provisions of the will, that it
was not the intention of the testatrix to vest the substance of her gifts
in her children or husband, but in the issue of her children, and in
default of issue, to those whom the children should appoint; and in
default of such appointment, and of heirs of her body, in those in
whose favor the remainder over was limited.
Not only by the express terms of the will, but also by a necesgary
implication, arising from the duties imposed, the title to the estate

NEWELL v. RIDGWAY.

in question vested in the trustees, and must needs continue in them,
until the purposes of the trust were accomplished, and that at least
so long as the children lived. No title or interest in law vested in
the ce itd ue tru.st-the children and husband of the testatrix.
They acquired equities under the will, but no legal estate in the
property itself: 1 Rev. Stats. 729, § 60 ; Amory v. Lord, 5 Seld.
40 ; knox v. knox, 47 N. Y. 396. To hold that the title to this
property vested in the beneficiaries would, I think, be in manifest
opposition to the intention of the testatrix.
From the death of the testatrix, the legal title was in the trustees,
and so remained until the death of the children and husband, and
the heirs at law and personal representatives, or next of kin of the
children, take nothing under the will unless one child died in the
lifetime of the other; in which event the personal representatives
of the surviving child, would administer, under the statute, its share
in the personal estate to which it was entitled as the only living
heir of the body of the testatrix, and the heirs at law of the survivor
would succeed to its share of the real westate. But the burden of
proving such survivorship, as already stated, must rest upon those
who affirm the fact and .claim thereunder. The trust was active
and legal in its inception and purposes, as was the disposition over
of the remainder; and on the happening of the contingencies contemplated-that is, upon the death of the children without issue
and without heirs of the body of the testatrix then living, the estate
in the trustees was ended, and the remainder over vested in possession in those in whose favor it was limited.
In the cases of. Underwood v. WTig and Wing v. Angrave, supra,
one of the conditions upon which the estate over was-given to Wing,
was that Mrs. Underwood should die in the lifetime of her husband.
This was considered to be a condition precedent to the consummation and vesting of the gift. In that case a child (the daughter)
survived, for a brief period, her parents and brothers. Failing the
gift over, she, as next of kin and heir at law, became legally invested with the estate. She had the prima facie right to the property, and claim was made by her legal representatives. The
daughter's right to the property was absolute, unless the property
was conveyed away by the will. Hence it was incumbent upon
those claiming under the will, to show that the condition upon,
which the estate was given to Wing-namely, the death of the
wife in the lifetime of her husband-had occurred. In the case at
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bar the gift over is a contingent estate in remainder, depending
upon the ultimate event of there being no heirs of the body of the
testatrix at the death of her children: 1 Rev. Stat. 72:3, §§ 9, 10,
11, 13 ; Powers v. Bergen, 6 N. Y. 360 ; Leslie v. 3Iarshall, 31
Barb. 560, and is construed to be a conditional limitation.
A remainder may be limited on a contingency, which, in case it
should happen, will operate to abridge or determine the pre('cdent
estate, and every such remainder shall be construed a conditional
limitation and shall have the same effect as such limitation would
have by law : 1 Rev. Stat. 7"25, § 27. And a conditional limitation carries the estate over to the persons to whom it is limited,
upon the happening of the contingency; 4 Kent's Com. 127; 2
Washburn on Real Prop. 20-22, and cases cited.
If upon failure of that upon which the estate is made to depend,
no matter how expressed, the land is to go to a third person, this
is a limitation over and not a condition. It was an inflexible rule
of the common law that the remainder must vest at the momentif not sooner vested-of the 'determination of the precedent estate,
or else it could not vest at all : Campbell v. IRau'don, 18 N. Y.
418. Such estates were liable to be defeated by circumstances subsequent to their creation ; but the validity of the limitation is never
questioned: Idem.
But for the subsequent limitation to the Ridgways and Gunns,
the property would have passed to the residuary legatees or heirs
at law. But that limitation does not fail, because the precedent
estate did not take effect.
Where a devise is limited to take effect upon a condition or contingency annexed to a preceding estate, if that preceding estate
should not arise, the remainder over will take place-the first estate
being considered as a preceding limitation and not as a preeeding
condition: Norris v. Bergen, 13 X. Y. 287 ; Warren v. iludall,
4 Kay & Johns. 603; S. C. law Jour. 1859, N. S. vol. 28, part
1, p. 70; Buekworth v. Thirkell, 3 Bos. & Pull. 652, n. As
when a testator meant to dispose of all his property, and uses the
words "if the legatee should not survive" held to mean "if the
preceding legacy should from any cause fail :" Anlyn v. Ward, 1
, 2 Bro. C. C. 396 ; Jones
v. Vesey, Sr. 419, n.;
v. Westcombe, 1 Eq. Abdt. 2451; Foster v. Cook, 3 Brown's Ch.
296 ; Doe v. Brebant, 3 Bro. C. C. 397 ; Taylor v. Taylor, 1 Atk.
386; Jackson ex dem. Beach v. Dusland, 2 Johns. Cases 314.
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The dispositions made by the will of the property during the
lives of the children being legal, in whom could the estate vest,
under the facts, when liberated from the trust by the death of the
children, other than those to whom the remainder was limited ? No
one can lawfully claim in opposition to the remainderman, except
through one of the children as a survivor. For unless one child
survived, there was no living heir of the body of the testatrix.
There can be no new stock of descent, except through a surviving
child; and in order to lay the foundation for such claim, the fact
must be proven by the person claiming. There can be no presumption of such survivorship.
In the case of Underwood v. Wing, there was a child who survhed, who, as heir or next of kin, had the prima facie right, and
through whom her legal representative and next of kin claimed.
Ilere there is no evidence of the existence of a surviving heir of
the body of the testatrix, through whom his or her legal representatives or n'ext of kin may claim, through a prima facie right. 'ho
are the heirs or next of kin in whom the legal estate can vest, to
the exclusion of those in whose favor the remainder is limited ?
and of whom are they such heirs or next of kin-the son or the
daughter. They might be such as well of the son as the daughter.
It is the merest speculation or conjecture as to whether there
was a survivorship .at all, and both cannot be entitled. Nor is
the necessity of proving a survivorship wholly obviated, through
an attempted solution of the difficulty by adjudging an intestacy
as to the remainder, at the death of the children. In such condition
the obstacle is not overcome, but only postponed. The legal title
was not in the children, and they had nothing, if they perished in
the same moment, to transmit.
In the- case of JMtite v. Howard, infra, it was held that a
remainder in four-sixths of the real estate of the testator, contingent upon the death of his daughter leaving no descend7ants her
surviving, was not embraced in the trust created by the testator,
as the devisees were incapable of taking, and the remainder was
undisposed of by the will. The daughter was the sole heir. She
became seised at the death of the testator of this remainder, as the
heir of her father; and being so seised, upon her death the estate
went to her heirs. But it is obvious that this result was reached
only through the original invalidity of the devise over; the devisees, four charitable societies, being incapable by law of taking by
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devise. But in the case we are considering there is no inherent
invalidity in the gift, as the remaindermen are capable of taking.
But if it be adjudged that, from the difficulty only in carrying
it into effect, and not from any inability on the part of the persons
to take the remainder, the testamentary disposition must fail, then
the next of kin and heirs at law of the surviving child would, in
the first instance, take. But if the life estate was terminated by
the death of both in the same instant, they being not seibed or possessed Sf the estate, then the heirs at law, and next of kin of the
testatrix, take. But tfiey can only take on the contingency which
limits the remainder to the children and heirs of the Ridgways and
Gunns; and such. adjudication, while it would clearly defeat the
intention of the testatrix, would work needless injustice.
In Wright v. Samada, Taylor v. Diplock, and Satterthwaite v.
-Powell, supra, the effect of the decisions is to cast the burthen of
proof upon the next of kin, who claim derivatively through a survivorship of one out of several, lost in a common calamity, to prove
the fact.
The intention of the testatrix is clear. She desired that her
property should go in the first place, to her direct descendants,
heirs of her body, and only when there were no such descendants
it should go to her collateral blood relatives, designated by lir.
Those who claim affirmatively, that at the respective deaths of the
two children there were heirs of the body of the testatrix, through
whom they are entitled to succeed, must show it. Those to whom
the remainder is devised and bequeathed, make out a case to entitle
them to the estate, when they prove the loss of the issue of the
body of the testatrix by the same disaster; as, under such circumstances, without proof of survivorship, the default contemplated
has occurred-the limitation to the heirs of the body of the testatrix ha failed,'and the remainder over to the Ridgways and Gunns
must be held to have taken effect.
The question whether the real estate, by the provisions of the
will, was equitably converted into personal was argued on the hearing. To constitute a conversion of real estate into personal, in the
absence of an actual sale, it must be made the duty, and be obligatory upon the trustees to sell in any event-a, mere discretionary
power of selling produces no such effect: White v. Howard, 46 N.
Y. 144-162.
I do not find in the will any such absolute duty or obligation to
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sell. The direction is to set apart, sell, mortgage, lease or otherwise
dispose of same, as by the trustees might be deemed advisable.
They doubtless had the power to sell, but were not obliged to do
so, if in their judgment tile purposes of the will could be accomplished by setting apart, mortgaging or leasing. And not having
been sold, there is no equitable conversion of. the real estate, and
the property must be viewed as it was at the death of the testatrix:
Harrisv. Clark, 3 Seld. 242.
But under tb6 views above expressed I do not see that it changes
the result, whether the property was equitably converted or not.
By the expression in the will "to the children or heirs of Frederick
A. Ridgway, Moses Rlidgway, John Gunn and Henry Gunn," is
meant to the children or heirs of each of those persons. Any other
construction would be contrary to the evident intention to the testatrix-especially so in view of the fact in evidence, that John
Gunn had been dead several years when the will was executed.
The devisees take per 8tirpes, and not per capita; and one-fourth
part of the estate in remainder belongs to the children or heirs of
each of the persons above named: 2 Kent's Com. 425 ; Bool v.
Mix, 17 Wend. 119; Zessell's Appeal, 27 Penna. St. 55; Bassett
v. Granger, 100 Mass. 348.
'The case shows that the trustees did not sell the real estate, or
create by a conversion of the property of the testatrix the investments contemplated by her for her children and husband. Their
efforts to sell the real estate to this end proved unavailing.
There is no proof of any negligence on their part in this matter,
and it is urged on their behalf that the whole estate was not of a
sufficient value to raise the amounts. The rule is, without doubt,
that where trustees under a will are directed to make investments
to a specific amount out of property and funds sufficient for the
purpose-the income of which is directed to be paid to persons
designated-that such persons are entitled to legal interest on the
amount directed to be invested. Sometimes, however, the rate is
adjusted at five or six per cent. But if the estate was insufficient
to raise the funds for such investment, such rule is not applicable.
No investment having been specifically made, and the character
of the estate, as it came into the bands of the trustees, not having
been materially changed, the income of the whole estate, after,
payment ot debts and specific legacies, should be passed to the
credit of the cestuis que trust, up to the time of their deaths, to
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an amount equal to six per centum per annum upon the sums
directed to be invested from the death of the testatrix. But
if insufficient to pay such amount, I do not think that the deficiency should be made a charge upon, or be paid out of the corpus
of, the estate. The value and condition of the estate does not justify any such direction.
If correct in the views above expressed, the power of sale with
which the executors were clothed cannot now be exercised, as the
realty has passed over to those to whom the remainder was given.
The power to sell was given only to raise the moneys out of which
the investments directed were to be made. But as that exigency
now no longer exists, the ccstuis que trzust being dead, there is no
occasion for the exercise of the power. Nor is any conveyance
from the trustees necessary, as their estate terminated with the
death of the father and children.
A reference is needed to pass upon and settle the accounts of the
xeeutors and trustees, to the end that they may be relieved of further duty and care, and the estate closed; which reference may
extend, if it be desired, to an inquiry as to the nature and value
of the estate at the death of the testatrix, and as to what, if any,
part thereof has been sold or otherwise disposed of, and as to its
present value and condition, and the income received therefrom
and the charges thereon. The particulars of the reference to be
settled by the judgment to be entered therein.
From this decision an appeal was taken to the General Term,
where the following opinion was delivered by
DAviS, P. J.-Our examination has led us to the same conclusions reached by Mr. Justice VAX VorsT, both upon the law and
facts of the case.
The questions involved are intricate and interesting. The
opinion above quoted discusses them with marked clearness and
ability, and exhibits the most commendable care and research. We
are not disposed to impair its value to the profession by entering
upon any new or further discussion, but content ourselves with
adopting it as a full and satisfactory expression of the views of this
court.
The judgment appealed from should be affirmed, but under the
circumstances of the case, the costs of the appeal on both sides
Ordered accordingly.
should be paid out of the fund.
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United States Circuit Court.

-Districtof Kansas.

FARMERS' LOAN AND TRUST CO., TRUSTEE, V. B. S. HENNING, RECEIVER OF THE: LEAVENWORTH, LAWRENCE AND GALVESTON
RAILROAD CO.
Where a railroad company constructs and operates its road over its line, under
the powers and privileges of its charter, it cannot thereafter abandon the same,
even though its charter, in its inception, was merely permissive and not mandatory.
Where Congress donates land to a state to aid in building railroads, there is a
beneficial interest therein, vested in the state, and where such lands are granted to
a railroad company, by the state, in consideration that the company shall build
its road, and such grant is duly accepted, a valid contract is created, which is obligatory on the company, to complete its road ; and compliance with such charter
duty, and contract obligation, can be enforced by mandamus.

THis was an application by the attorney-general of the state of
Kansas for an order on the receiver of the Leavenworth, Lawrence
and Galveston Railroad Company to repair and operate said railroad
to the 'City of Leavenworth, the initial point named in its charter.
The railroad was in the hands of said receiver, who was appointed
by this court in an action by the Farmers' Loan and Trust Company,
trustee, to foreclose its mortgage against said railroad. The petition of the attorney-general recited the original and amended charters of said company, granted by the territory and state of Kansas
respectively, and dated February 12th 1858, and February 29th
1864, by which said company was authorized to construct, maintain
and operate a railroad from .Leavenworth, by the way of Lawrence,
to the southern line of the state.
Also, the grant of lands by the general government to the state
of Kansas, to aid in the construction of said railroad, dated March
8d 1863; the act of the legislature accepting said grant by the
state, and transferring the same to the said railroad company, dated
February 13th 1864, and the acceptance by the company of the
congressional grant and of the provisions of the said legislative act,
dated March 12th 1864, the state grant of one hundred ind twentyfive thousand acres of land, to aid in the construction of said railroad, dated February 23d 1866, and the acceptance of the same by
the company, dated May 16th 1866.
Also, an act of the legislature changing the name of said company
from the Leavenworth, Lawrence and Fort Gibson Railroad Company to the Leavenworth, Lawrence and Galveston Railroad Company, approved February 24th 1866.
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And the said petition further alleged that said railrcad company
did, in pursuance of its charter and agreements, construct, and
since the year 1872 did operate and maintain its road, from a point
of junction with the Kansas Pacific Railroad, on the north side of
the Kansas river, opposite the city of Lawrence, to the south line
of the state, and did, under an agreement with the Kansas Pacific
Company, run its cars and transport its freight and passengers over
said last-named railroad, from its junction therewith to and from
the city of Leavenworth, thus making a continuous line from said
city, via Lawrence to the south line of the state. That said Ilenning was appointed receiver of said railroad by an order of this
court on the 5th day of March 1875, and that said receiver continued to operate and maintain said road, as aforesaid, until the 8th
day of June 1877. That since said last mentioned date said receiver has refused and neglected, and does still refuse and neglect,
to operate said railroad from Lawrence to Leavenworth, or to run
its cars for transporting freight and passengers to and from Leavenworth, under said agreement with the Kanses Pacific Company, and
has abandoned said line of road, and refuses and neglects to maintain the bridge of said company across the Kansas river at Lawrence,
and has permitted the same to remain unused and to go to decay,
to the great damage of the commerce of the state, and especially of
the cities of Leavenworth and Lawrence, and to the detriment of
the travelling public; and praying for an order that said receiver
be required to repair and maintain said railroad and bridge, and
operate said road, as heretofore, from Leavenworth to Lawrence,
and from thence to the southern line of the state, as provided by
its said charter.
To this petition the receiver filed u general demurrer.

Wilard -Davis, Attorney-General, and 1. B. Johnson, for the
state.

Wallace Pratt and &.. 0. Thatcher, for respondent.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
FOSTER, J.-The allegations of the petition standing confessed,
and no question being made as to the form of the proceedings, the
main question is to determine what obligations and duties the railroad company owes to the state, under its charter and the grants
of land by the general government and the state, and the acceptance
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thereof by said company. And to these questions the arguments
of counsel have been addressed, and have taken a wide range.
It appears to be well supported by authority and reason that the
powers and privileges granted by the charters of this company are
permissive only, and not obligatory, and the company could elect
whether it would proceed to exercise the franchises thereby granted,
or whether it would not. And if it chose the latter course, the
only penalty would be a forfeiture of the rights'and privilees conferred: York ,J North Midland Railroad Co. v. The Queen, 1 E.
&B. 855 ; State of _finnesota v. The Souther 3_innesotaRailroad
Co., 18 Minn. 40 ; High's Extraordinary Legal Remedies, sect. 316.
It was held by the Court of Exchequer Chamber, in the case first
above cited, that the mandamus would not lie to compel the company
to exercise its franchises as to a part of the route named in its
charter, and abandoned by the company when it had not actually
proceeded to build or operate its road over the part abandoned, and
no corrupt motives are imputed to the company in abandoning the
line. But when the company has once built and operated its railroad between the points named in its charter, the case seems to
stand on different grounds, and it seems the company may be compelled by mandamus to carry out the objects for which it was created,
and to exercise its charter obligations.
The following cases sustain and carry out this view: State v.
The ifartford , N. ff. Railroad Co., 29 Conn. 538; King v.
Severn J
yJe Railroad Co., 2 B. & Ald. 644; High's Ex. Legal
Remedies, sects. 317, 319, 320 ; The People ex rel. v. The. Troy
& Boston Railroad Co., 37 low. Pr. 427; The People v. The
Albany J- Vermont Railroad Co., 24 N. Y. 261; Same case, 37
Barb. 216.
The case last cited has been referred to by defendants' counsel
as a strong case in defendants' favor, and it, is urged that the only
remedy of the state is to take proceedings to annul and forfeit the
franchises of the company. But upon examination of the case in
24 N. Y., it will be seen that the opposite doctrine is held by a
majority of the judges. That proceeding was not by mandamus,
but was a proceeding by the attorney-general for an injunction, and
for the specific performance of the charter obligations of the company,
and the main question to be decided was whether such a proceeding
could be sustained.
It is true Judge WRGIT, who delivered the opinion of the court,
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went farther, and not only argues that the action could not be maintained, but that by no proceeding could the company be compelled
to keep up and operate its road, and that the only remnedy the
people had was indictment or proceedings to forfeit the fr:nchise.
But while all the judges concurred in the conclusion, i. e., that the
judgment of the Supreme Court dismissing the bill should be
affirmed, four out of the six judges sitting in the case "however
were of the opinion that a corporation is under a legal obligation
to exercise its franchises, and that it has not the option to discontinue a part of its road and forfeit its franchise. They agree that
the remedy is not by action in equity for a specific performance,
but by mandamus or indictment, or, at the election of the people,
by proceeding to annul the existence of the corporation." So it
is apparent this case is in point that the state may proceed, by
mandamus, to compel the company to exercise its corporate powers
when it has once constructed and operated its road. Having entered
upon the exercise of its charter franchises it then owes a duty to the
public which it may not, at its caprice, abandon. And in equity
and good conscience the obligation is still greater where the company has been the recipient of land grants and subsidies to aid the
construction of its road.
Havihg said this much as to the rights, privileges and duties of
the company under its charter, I might rest this case here. But
as the legal effect of the land grants made to and accepted by the
company has been discussed by the counsel, I will briefly state the
view in which that matter presents itself to my mind. Undoubtedly
the ultimate object of the Congress in granting lands to aid the
construction of a railroad from Leavenworth via Lawrence, to the
southern line of the state, was to secure the construction and operation of the road from the initial point named in the act of Congress.
This was a-grant in. yrwsenti to the state of Kansas, in trust to
aid the construction of two designated lines of railroad, and the
lands could not be diverted to any other purpose. It seems to be
the settled doctrine of the Supreme Court of the United States
that grants of this nature are not mere naked trusts, but vest a
benefieial interest in the state. In the case of the United States
against this same company, known as the Osage Land Case, 2 Otto
748, the court, speaking of this Act of Congress, uses this language: "The scope and effect of the Act of 1863 cannot, in our
opinion, be misunderstood. The different parts harmonize with
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each other and present in a clear light the scheme as an entirety,
Kansas needed railroads to develop her resources, and Congress was
willing to aid her to build them, by a grant of a part of the
national domain." * * *
In the case of Rice v. Railroad Co., 1 Black 378, 379, the
Supreme Court had under consideration an Act of Congress of
1854, granting lands to the territory of Minnesota to aid in the
construction of a railroad, which act contained these words: "No
title shall vest in the territory of Minnesota." And the court held
in that case, by reason of this provision in the act that no present
beneficial interest passed to the territory, and that previous to any
rights becoming vested under it, Congress could revoke the grant.
But it will be seen, at pages 378-9 and 381, the court draws a
distinction between grants like this one and the Minnesota grant,
and refer to their decision in the case of Leesius v. Price,12 How.
76, and Justice NELSON, in his dissenting opinion, at page 382,
again reiterates the same doctrine and says: "The grantee in all
such cases takes a beneficial interest in the grant, as the representative of the persons for whose benefit it is made."
The stati of Kansas was interested in building railroads within
her limits, and thus developing her resources and inducing immigration to the state, and surely had a particular interest in securing
the purpose for whicl this grant was made. This grant was not
made to the Leavenworth, Lawrence and Fort Gibson Railroad
Company, or to any other company. The power was clearly vested
in the state to select the company to build the road, and generally
to direct and control the grant for the purposes named in the Act
of Congress. And it is fair to assume that the state, as trustee,
having an interest in the grant, could impose such proper terms
and donditions, in executing the trust, as were not in conflict with
the provisions of the act, and were best calculated to secure the
object contemplated; and the company having given its consent to
such terms and conditions, and received the lands, was bound to
comply with its agreement.
In sect. 2 of the act of the legislature, accepting the grant and
transferring it to the railroad company, are these words: "In consideration that the Leavenworth, Lawrence and Fort Gibson Railroad and Telegraph Company shall construct a railroad and telegraph from the city of Leavenworth, by way of th6 town of Lawrence * * *, to the southern line of the state, in the direction
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of Galveston Bay * * *, the state of Kansas hereby agrees to
grant, bargain and sell to said company all that portion of lands
granted to the state by the above-named Act of Congress, applicable
to the construction of the above-described railroad."
Said act further provided that the company should, within six
months, file its acceptance of the provisions of this act with the
secretary of state, and; in default thereof, all grants and provisions
therein contained as to this company shall cease and be void.
To this act the company filed the following acceptance of March
12th 1864: "Resolved, by the president and board of directors
of the Leavenworth, Lawrence and Fort Gibson Railroad Company,
that said company hereby accept said grant of lands accordinig to
the stipulations of said act of the legislature of the state of Kansas
and of the Congress of the United States.
"Resolved, that the secretary be and he is hereby instructed to
transmit to the office of the secretary of state of Kansas a copy
of the above acceptance of said grant of land."
It seems apparent to my mind that the first stipulation of the act
was that the company should build its road from the city of Leavenworth, and that its acceptance, by the company, crehted an obligation on the part of the company by which it was bound to build
its road from that point; and even if the state imposed a condition
not contained in the grant, as it was acceded to by this company,
it cannot now object, and it is bound by its agreement: Baker v.
Gee, 1 Wall. 333. I am therefore of the opinion that the state
has the right to require the said railroad company to exercise the
fianchises of its charter over the abandoned portion of its line,
because:1. Having constructed and maintained and operated its road
over said line, under the powers and privileges of its charter, it
cannot thereafter, at its option, abandon the same.
2. The stipulation in the second section of the said act of the
legislature, and the acceptance of said act by the company, created
a contract, obligatory on the company, to build its railroad from
the city of Leavenworth.
The demurrer must be overruled.

